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INTRODUCTION 
 Nearly 60 years ago, Larry Boynton worked at the Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC 
(“KUC”) smelter where he was allegedly exposed to asbestos-containing products and, as 
a result, carried asbestos fibers home on his work clothing.  His wife, Barbara Boynton, 
was then allegedly exposed to those fibers while laundering that clothing.1  This type of 
exposure is known as “take-home exposure” or “non-occupational exposure.”  Mrs. 
Boynton was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma on February 4, 2016 and died on 
February 27, 2016.  This appeal considers whether a premises owner, like KUC, owes a 
duty in a take-home asbestos exposure case to a family member who never set foot on its 
premises.   
Mr. Boynton filed suit against KUC, PacifiCorp, and Phillips 66/ConocoPhillips 
(“Conoco”) (collectively the “Premises Defendants”) alleging claims of strict premises 
liability and negligence.  The allegations against the Premises Defendants are identical 
and consist of failures to act, or nonfeasance.  Mr. Boynton alleges that Mrs. Boynton 
was exposed to asbestos because the Premises Defendants failed to prevent Mr. Boynton 
from carrying asbestos fibers home on his clothing and failed to warn him of the potential 
hazards of asbestos exposure.  The Premises Defendants moved for summary judgment 
arguing that they did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton.  Judge Randall Skanchy denied 
KUC’s motion, finding a disputed issue of material fact (without identifying the disputed 
fact), and granted the very similar motions of PacifiCorp and Conoco.   
                                                 
1 For purposes of this appeal only, KUC assumes Mr. and Mrs. Boynton were exposed to 
asbestos because whether or not they were actually exposed is irrelevant to whether KUC 
owed Mrs. Boynton a duty.    
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The district court’s denial of KUC’s motion for summary judgment should be 
reversed because KUC did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton.  Whether a duty exists is a 
question of law, not a question of fact.  In B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, this Court listed five 
factors relevant to determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff: 
(1) whether the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct consists of an 
affirmative act or merely an omission; (2) the legal relationship of the 
parties; (3) the foreseeability or likelihood of injury; (4) public policy as to 
which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury; and (5) other 
general policy considerations. 
 
2012 UT 11, ¶ 5, 275 P.3d 228 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  The first two 
factors are “plus” factors because they create a duty while the last three factors are 
“minus” factors because they eliminate a duty that would otherwise exist.  Id.  
KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of nonfeasance.  When a claim is 
based on a defendant’s nonfeasance, as is the case here, a duty does not exist without a 
special relationship.  KUC therefore does not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton because it is 
undisputed there is no legal relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton.   
Even if KUC engaged in misfeasance, the three “minus” factors would eliminate 
any duty created by that misfeasance.  First, harm from take-home asbestos exposure was 
not reasonably foreseeable to KUC when Mr. Boynton worked at the smelter (1961–66).  
Although the danger of very high direct occupational asbestos exposure, such as in 
asbestos mining and asbestos textile milling and manufacturing, may have been generally 
foreseeable during this time period, the potential harm of take-home exposure was not.  
Indeed, there was no real consensus about the risk of exposure to family members until 
1972 at the very earliest, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
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(“OSHA”) first addressed take-home asbestos exposure.2  As a result, multiple courts 
have held that harm from take-home exposure was not reasonably foreseeable prior to the 
enactment of those OSHA regulations.3   
Second, KUC was not best situated to prevent harm from take-home exposure 
because Mr. Boynton was the one who actually carried the fibers home on his clothing.  
Third, public policy disfavors imposing a duty in take-home exposure cases.  If the 
Court finds that KUC owed a duty to Mrs. Boynton, KUC would arguably owe a duty to 
any other person with whom Mr. Boynton’s clothes came into contact because there is no 
principled basis for distinguishing such claims.  Take-home exposure liability creates 
limitless liability for premises owners and virtually an infinite number of potential 
plaintiffs.  
                                                 
2 Georgia Pac., LLC v. Farrar, 69 A.3d 1028, 1037 (Md. 2013) (“In addition to setting a 
maximum level of airborne asbestos fibers to which workers could be exposed during an 
8-hour period, the [1972] regulations require, among other things, that employers (1) 
provide and require the use of special protective clothing, including head covering, 
gloves, and foot coverings for employees exposed to airborne concentrations of asbestos 
fibers that exceed the maximum allowed level; (2) provide change rooms and lockers for 
employees, so they may change from their work clothes into street clothes; and (3) 
provide for the laundering of asbestos-contaminated clothing in a safe manner.”) (citation 
omitted).   
3 See, e.g., Martin v. Gen. Elec. Co., 2007 WL 2682064, *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2007) 
(“Simply put, the literature at the time did not place [the defendant] on notice that 
bystanders/nonworkers such as Plaintiff’s Decedent were subject to health maladies due 
to second-hand exposure to asbestos-containing materials.”), aff’d, Martin v. Cincinnati 
Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 2009) (“We agree with the district court 
that [the plaintiff] has failed to show the risk was foreseeable at the relevant times.”); 
Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Texas, 740 N.W.2d 206, 
218 (Mich. 2007) (“Therefore, the risk of “take home” asbestos exposure was, in all 
likelihood, not foreseeable by defendant while [the worker] was working at defendant’s 
premises from 1954 to 1965.”). 
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The existence of a duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases is a matter of first 
impression for Utah appellate courts, but courts across the country have held there is no 
duty in such cases.4  This Court should follow those jurisdictions, hold that KUC did not 
owe Mrs. Boynton a duty, and reverse the district court. 
                                                 
4 Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. App. 2007) (“[T]he danger of non-
occupational exposure to asbestos dust on workers’ clothes was neither known nor 
reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant] in the 1950s.”); Bootenhoff v. Hormel Foods 
Corp., 2014 WL 3744011, *14 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2014) (“[L]ack of foreseeability and 
additional policy considerations dictate that [the defendant] did not owe a duty of care to 
Norma Bootenhoff.”); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005) 
(“[W]e decline to extend on the basis of foreseeability the employer’s duty beyond the 
workplace to encompass all who might come into contact with an employee or an 
employee’s clothing outside the workplace.”); Farrar, 69 A.3d at 1039 (“[W]e conclude 
that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding a duty on the part of [the defendant] to 
warn Ms. Farrar, back in 1968–69, of the danger of exposure to the dust on her 
grandfather’s clothes.”); Gillen v. Boeing Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(“[T]he Court concludes that [the defendant] owed no duty to Mrs. Gillen regarding her 
claim for ‘take-home exposure’ to asbestos.”); Fourteenth Dist., 740 N.W.2d at 222 
(“[W]e hold that, under Michigan law, defendant, as owner of the property on which 
asbestos-containing products were located, did not owe to the deceased, who was never 
on or near that property, a legal duty to protect her from exposure to any asbestos fibers 
carried home on the clothing of a member of her household who was working on that 
property as the employee of independent contractors, where there was no further 
relationship between defendant and the deceased.”); In re Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 
4571196, *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007) (“[T]he Court concludes that [the defendant] 
owed no duty to Mrs. Riedel to prevent her from being exposed to asbestos within her 
own home.”), aff'd sub nom. Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009); In re 
Asbestos Litig., 2012 WL 1413887, *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2012) (“[T]he court finds 
under Pennsylvania law an employer/premises owner does not owe a duty to the spouse 
of an employee in the take home asbestos exposure context.”); In re New York City 
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 116 (N.Y. 2005) (concluding there is “no duty of care” 
in take-home exposure cases); Martin, 2007 WL 2682064 at *5 (“[B]ecause it was not 
generally foreseeable to either [defendant] during the relevant time period herein that 
intermittent, non-occupational exposure to asbestos could put those person[s] at risk of 
contracting serious illness, no duty existed.”), aff’d, Martin, 561 F.3d at 445; Van Fossen 
v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 2009) (“[T]he district court 
correctly concluded [defendants] owed no duty to Ann, a household member of an 
independent contractor’s employee.”). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue:  Inasmuch as the issue of duty is a legal question, did the district court err in 
denying KUC’s motion for summary judgment and concluding there was a disputed issue 
of material fact as to whether KUC owed a duty of care to Mrs. Boynton?  
Standard of Review:  A district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the district court.  Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (“An appellate court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness . . . .”) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted); Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, ¶ 10, 221 P.3d 219 (“We 
review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, giving no 
deference to the district court.”).   
Preservation:  KUC preserved this issue for appeal by filing a motion for 
summary judgment seeking a ruling that KUC does not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton.  (R. 
04162–80.)  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Mr. Boynton’s work at KUC’s premises 
Mr. Boynton married Mrs. Boynton in September 1962.  (R. 04165, 05008.)  After 
their marriage, Mr. Boynton worked as a laborer at KUC’s smelter and continued in that 
position for “[p]robably 12 to 15 months” (from 1962 to late 1963 or early 1964).  (R. 
04165.)  Mr. Boynton claims he was exposed to asbestos as a laborer by working in the 
vicinity of workers who removed and installed pipe insulation and for approximately a 
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five-month period while cleaning up pipe insulation.  (R. 04165–66.)  He then worked as 
an apprentice and journeyman electrician for Wasatch Electric at KUC’s smelter from 
1964 to 1966.  (R. 04165, 04242.)  In that capacity, he was responsible for “[r]unning 
pipe, conduit, pulling wire, terminating, [and] heat trace” on “newer construction and 
remodel, upgrades . . . plant-wide, around the converter aisle and places like that.”  (R. 
04197, 04242, 05241.)  He believes he was exposed to asbestos from the installation of 
the insulation on pipes and dry asbestos mix that was used by pipe fitters who worked 2 
to 20 feet away from him.  (R. 04166.)  Mrs. Boynton never visited KUC’s premises.  (R. 
04166, 05008.)   
There is no evidence whatsoever that KUC had knowledge of any potential danger 
from take-home asbestos exposure.  
B. Mr. Boynton’s work at PacifiCorp and Conoco’s premises 
Mr. Boynton was employed as an electrician for (1) Jelco Electric and worked at 
PacifiCorp’s Huntington Plant for 5 to 6 months in 1973; and (2) L.E. Myers Electric and 
worked at the Conoco refinery off and on from 1976–78.  (R. 02237, 02393, 02359.)  
Similar to his work for Wasatch Electric at KUC’s smelter, his duties at PacifiCorp and 
Conoco involved “[r]unning conduit, pulling wire, cable tray, [and] heat tracing pipes.”  
(R. 02685–86, 02393.)  At PacifiCorp, he was allegedly exposed to asbestos while 
working within 5 to 20 feet of insulators who were sawing and installing pipe insulation 
as well as insulation on boilers and turbines.  (R. 02256–57.)  He made the same 
allegations about his time at Conoco and added that the insulators removed the old 
asbestos pipe insulation and let it fall to the ground close to where he was working.  (Id.)  
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C. Mr. Boynton’s allegations against KUC, PacifiCorp, and Conoco 
Mr. Boynton alleges that Mrs. Boynton died from mesothelioma that she 
contracted from laundering his work clothing.  (R. 04165.)  Mr. Boynton brought strict 
premises liability and negligence claims against the Premises Defendants.  The 
allegations of wrongdoing against the Premises Defendants are identical and include the 
following:   
Premises Defendants negligently, recklessly, willfully and/or because of 
gross and wanton negligence, fault, or strict liability, failed to properly 
discharge its duties to Plaintiff in the following particulars: (a) failure to 
provide Plaintiff’s husband with a safe place to work; (b) failure to provide 
Plaintiff’s husband with adequate engineering or industrial hygiene 
measures to control the level of exposure to asbestos, including but not 
limited to local exhaust, general ventilation, respiratory protection, 
segregation of work involving asbestos, use of wet methods to reduce the 
release of asbestos into the ambient air, medical monitoring, air monitoring, 
and procedures to prevent the transportation of asbestos fibers home on 
Petitioner’s father’s clothing; and (c) failure to inform or warn Plaintiff’s 
husband of the hazards of asbestos exposure. . . .   
 
Premises Defendants negligently, recklessly, willfully and/or because of 
gross and wanton negligence or fault, failed to properly discharge their 
duties to the Plaintiff in the following: (a) failed to provide the Decedent’s 
husband with a safe work environment; (b) failed to provide the Decedent’s 
husband with safety equipment; (c) failed to provide the Decedent’s 
husband with correct, adequate, or proper safety equipment; (d) recklessly 
and negligently failed to disclose, warn or reveal critical medical and safety 
information regarding asbestos hazards in general and with regard to those 
specific hazards at the work site; (e) recklessly concealed and negligently 
omitted to reveal critically medical and safety information regarding the 
safety and health risks associated with the asbestos and asbestos-containing 
products at the worksites; (f) failed to timely remove asbestos hazards from 
the work place; (g) failed to properly supervise or monitor the work areas 
for compliance with safety regulations; (h) failed to provide a safe and 
suitable means of eliminating the amount of asbestos dust in the air; and (i) 
failed to provide the necessary facilities, practices and procedures that 
would lessen or eliminate the transfer of asbestos from the workplace to the 
home on the clothing and/or person of Larry Boynton.  
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(R. 04432–35 (emphasis added).) 
 
In his district court briefing, Mr. Boynton pointed to paragraph 13 from the 
Amended Complaint in arguing that the Premises Defendants engaged in 
affirmative acts of negligence (misfeasance):  
Mrs. Boynton was exposed to asbestos through her husband’s work with 
and around asbestos-containing products while working at locations 
including, but not limited to the following: [listing KUC, PacifiCorp, and 
Conoco locations].  The activities of cutting, chipping, mixing, sanding, 
sawing, scraping and sweeping that occurred in association with the work 
performed by Mr. Boynton and other workers working around Mr. Boynton 
with asbestos-containing products exposed him to great quantities of 
asbestos.  These asbestos exposures continued as asbestos-containing dust 
accumulated on his work clothes and was transported to his cars and home 
exposing his wife, Barbara Boynton, to great quantities of asbestos as she 
too came in contact with the asbestos-containing products carried home on 
those clothes and deposited into her home and cars.   
 
(R. 04419.)  But Mr. Boynton does not allege the Premises Defendants were 
negligent in doing these acts.  In other words, he does not allege the Premises 
Defendants were negligent in cutting, chipping, mixing, sanding, sawing, scraping, 
and sweeping asbestos-containing products. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Mr. Boynton filed his Amended Complaint on March 23, 2018.  (R. 01258.)  
Conoco moved for summary judgment on October 22, 2018; PacifiCorp moved for 
summary judgment on October 26, 2018; and KUC moved for summary judgment on 
November 21, 2018.  (R. 02246, 03380, 04180.)  The district court held a hearing on all 
of the motions on January 25, 2019.  (R. 05162.)  Then on March 13, 2019, the district 
court issued an order denying KUC’s motion for summary judgment and granting 
  9 
Conoco and PacifiCorp’s motions for summary judgment.  (R. 05447.)  In denying 
KUC’s motion, the district court determined there was “a disputed issue of material fact 
as to whether a legal duty extends to Mrs. Boynton.”  (Id.)  In granting the very similar 
motions of Conoco and PacifiCorp, the district court determined Conoco and PacifiCorp 
did not engage in any misfeasance that would create a duty to Mrs. Boynton, and that 
even if they did, each of the Jeffs “minus” factors weighed in favor of no duty.  (R. 
05443–47.)  The district court did not address any of the “minus” factors with respect to 
KUC’s motion and did not identify the supposed dispute of material fact that precluded 
summary judgment.  (R. 05447.)  KUC appeals that order.    
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Whether a duty exists is a question of law and should be articulated in relatively 
clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.  Jeffs, 
2012 UT 11, ¶ 23.  As a matter of law, KUC did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton who 
was never at or near KUC’s premises.  KUC’s allegedly tortious conduct consists only of 
nonfeasance, and no duty exists in cases of nonfeasance absent a special relationship, 
which here there undisputedly is not.  But even if KUC engaged in misfeasance, KUC did 
not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton because harm from take-home asbestos exposure was not 
reasonably foreseeable before 1972, KUC was not best positioned to prevent harm from 
take-home exposure, and public policy weighs heavily against take-home exposure 
liability.  The Court should therefore reverse the district court’s decision and hold that 
KUC did not owe Mrs. Boynton a duty.   
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ARGUMENT 
I. DUTY IS A QUESTION OF LAW AND SHOULD BE ARTICULATED IN 
RELATIVELY CLEAR, CATEGORICAL, BRIGHT-LINE RULES OF 
LAW APPLICABLE TO A GENERAL CLASS OF CASES. 
 
“[D]uty is one of four essential elements of a cause of action in tort” and is “an 
obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular 
standard of conduct toward another.”  Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 5 (citations omitted).  “Duty 
must be determined as a matter of law and on a categorical basis for a given class of tort 
claims” and “should be articulated in relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law 
applicable to a general class of cases.”  Id. at ¶ 23 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  The “general class of cases” here is take-home asbestos exposure claims 
against premises owners, which are end users of asbestos-containing products.   
II. KUC DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO MRS. BOYNTON BECAUSE KUC’S 
ALLEGED TORTIOUS CONDUCT CONSISTS ONLY OF 
NONFEASANCE AND THERE IS NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN KUC AND MRS. BOYNTON.   
 
The five Jeffs factors relevant to determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a 
plaintiff are: 
(1) whether the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct consists of an 
affirmative act or merely an omission; (2) the legal relationship of the 
parties; (3) the foreseeability or likelihood of injury; (4) public policy as to 
which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury; and (5) other 
general policy considerations. 
 
Id. at ¶ 5 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  Absent a special relationship, 
misfeasance is required for a duty to exist; conversely, a special relationship is typically 
required if the case involves only nonfeasance.  Id. at ¶ 7.  It is undisputed that KUC and 
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Mrs. Boynton are “legal strangers” for negligence purposes, so, without misfeasance, 
KUC owed no duty to Mrs. Boynton.  
A. KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of nonfeasance.  
 
“The long-recognized distinction between acts and omissions—or misfeasance and 
nonfeasance—makes a critical difference and is perhaps the most fundamental factor 
courts consider when evaluating duty.”  Id.  “Acts of misfeasance, or active misconduct 
working positive injury to others, typically carry a duty of care.”  Id. (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  “Nonfeasance—passive inaction, a failure to take positive steps to 
benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the 
defendant—by contrast, generally implicates a duty only in cases of special legal 
relationships.”  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).  The following two cases 
illustrate that KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of nonfeasance, not 
misfeasance.   
In Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., a child’s parents sued a provider of 
services to individuals with mental and physical disabilities after the provider’s employee 
sexually assaulted the child in a residential facility.  2015 UT 28, ¶¶ 3–9, 345 P.3d 619.  
Arguing that the facility owed a duty to the child because of the facility’s misfeasance, 
the plaintiffs pointed to the following allegations—“enticing children like [the victim] 
into [the residence] by keeping the door open, maintaining a portable swimming pool 
outside, and offering candy and television inside.”  Id. at ¶ 26.  But this was not 
misfeasance for purposes of duty analysis because the “crux” of the plaintiffs’ cases was 
not that the facility “was uncareful in the way it placed the portable swimming pool, or in 
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the manner in which it offered candy or television programming.”  Id. at ¶ 27.  The 
plaintiffs’ “core complaint” was instead that the facility’s nonfeasance—“in not 
performing an employment background check on [the assaulting employee], and in not 
providing training and supervision for [the employees]”—caused the child’s harm.  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  The facility’s “affirmative acts [were] a basis for imposing a duty 
in the performance of those acts, not for a broader duty to undertake additional measures 
aimed at preventing the sexual assault by a third party.”  Id. at ¶ 29 (emphasis in 
original).  Even though the facility had undertaken affirmative acts and even though the 
acts were “plausibly connected to the assault,” there was no duty based on the affirmative 
acts because plaintiffs’ claims were “aimed at [the facility’s] failures (as regards training, 
supervision, and employment background checks), and not its affirmative acts.”  Id. at ¶¶ 
26–29.5 
In this case, Mr. Boynton points to KUC’s supposed misfeasance of selecting 
asbestos-containing materials and chipping, sawing, and cutting asbestos-containing 
materials in arguing that KUC owed a duty to Mrs. Boynton.  But similar to Graves, the 
“crux” of this case is not that KUC “was uncareful in the way it [selected asbestos-
containing materials] or in the manner in which it [chipped, sawed, or cut asbestos-
containing materials].”  Id. at ¶ 27.  Instead, Mr. Boynton’s “core complaint” is that Mrs. 
Boynton developed mesothelioma because KUC failed to prevent Mr. Boynton from 
carrying asbestos fibers home on his clothing and to warn him of the potential hazards of 
                                                 
5 This Court ultimately found that there was a special relationship justifying the creation 
of a duty.  Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 36.   
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asbestos exposure.  KUC’s alleged affirmative acts of selecting asbestos-containing 
materials and chipping, sawing, and cutting those materials “are a basis for imposing a 
duty in the performance of those acts, not for a broader duty to undertake additional 
measures aimed at preventing [take-home asbestos exposure].”  Id. at ¶ 29.  Like Graves, 
Mr. Boynton’s claims are “aimed at [KUC’s] failures . . . and not its affirmative acts.”  
Id.   
This Court’s opinion in Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. further illustrates 
that KUC’s alleged tortious conduct consists only of misfeasance.  2013 UT 60, ¶¶ 38–
41, 321 P.3d 1054.  In Hill, the issue was whether a lawn mowing company owed a duty 
to apartment residents to prevent hazards associated with tree roots growing hidden in the 
grass.  Id. at ¶ 1.  Plaintiff argued there was a duty because the defendant had voluntarily 
undertaken the affirmative act of mowing the lawn.  Id. at ¶ 38.  But the plaintiff “fail[ed] 
to connect up any activity that [the lawn mowing company] voluntarily undertook with 
an allegation of negligence in the performance of that activity.”  Id. at ¶ 39 (emphasis in 
original).  The plaintiff’s real claim was “that her injury could have been prevented if 
[defendant] had chosen to undertake additional activities” related to the tree roots 
growing hidden in the grass.  Id. at ¶ 41 (emphasis in original).  Therefore, the 
defendant’s duty “was limited to the extent of its undertaking—a duty that is narrowly 
construed, and not a basis for a general obligation to undertake affirmative acts in aid of 
third parties.”  Id.  
Like Hill, Mr. Boynton has “fail[ed] to connect up any activity that [KUC] 
voluntarily undertook with an allegation of negligence in the performance of that 
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activity.”  Id. at ¶ 39 (emphasis in original).  There are no allegations of negligence 
related to the selection of asbestos-containing materials or the chipping, sawing, or 
cutting of those materials.  Instead, Mr. Boynton’s alleged actions of negligence against 
KUC concern failures only, not active misconduct.  Mr. Boynton claims KUC failed to 
provide the necessary facilities, practices, and procedures that would lessen or eliminate 
the transfer of asbestos from the workplace to the home on the clothing and/or person of 
Mr. Boynton.  Indeed, Mr. Boynton’s real claim is that Mrs. Boynton’s harm from 
asbestos exposure “could have been prevented if [KUC] had chosen to undertake 
additional activities” to prevent Mr. Boynton from carrying asbestos fibers home on his 
clothing.  Id. at ¶ 41 (emphasis in original).  
This is clearly a case of alleged omissions.  The premise of Mr. Boynton’s case 
against KUC is for its failures, not any acts of affirmative misconduct or misfeasance.  
Accordingly, KUC only owed Mrs. Boynton a duty if there was a special relationship 
between them.  
B. There is no special relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton.   
 
Nonfeasance “generally implicates a duty only in cases of special relationships.”  
Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 7.  “The essence of a special relationship is dependence by one party 
upon the other or mutual dependence between the parties.”  Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 
P.2d 413, 415–16 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted).  Traditional examples include “common 
carrier to its passenger, innkeeper and guest, landowner and invitees to his land, and one 
who takes custody of another.”  Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 8 (citation omitted).  Mrs. Boynton 
was not employed by KUC, and she never even stepped foot on its premises.  As a result, 
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there is no dispute that KUC and Mrs. Boynton are “legal strangers” for negligence 
purposes.  See Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 538 (“Mrs. Gillen’s relationship with [the 
defendant] as it relates to her take-home exposure claim is essentially that of ‘legal 
strangers’ under the law of negligence.”).  Since there are no allegations of misfeasance 
and since there is no special relationship between KUC and Mrs. Boynton, KUC did not 
owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton as a matter of law.   
III. THE THREE MINUS FACTORS, PARTICULARLY FORESEEABILITY, 
WOULD ELIMINATE ANY DUTY CREATED BY MISFEASANCE.   
 
 The final three Jeffs factors are “minus” factors because they “eliminate a duty 
that would otherwise exist.”  2012 UT 11, ¶ 5.  This means that even if KUC’s alleged 
tortious conduct includes misfeasance, the following factors eliminate any duty arising 
from that misfeasance.    
A. Harm from take-home asbestos exposure was not reasonably 
foreseeable before the 1972 OSHA Regulations.    
  
Foreseeability analysis for duty “is distinct from that for breach or proximate 
cause.”  Mower v. Baird, 2018 UT 29, ¶ 24, 422 P.3d 837.  It “does not question the 
specifics of the alleged tortious conduct such as the specific mechanism of the harm;” 
instead, it “relates to the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the 
victim and the general foreseeability of harm.”  Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 25 (quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  “The appropriate foreseeability question for duty analysis is 
whether a category of cases includes individual cases in which the likelihood of some 
type of harm is sufficiently high that a reasonable person could anticipate a general risk 
of injury to others.”  Id. at ¶ 27.  For this appeal, the relevant foreseeability question is 
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whether harm from take-home asbestos exposure was foreseeable to a premises owner, 
which was an end user of asbestos-containing products, where the exposure occurred 
prior to the 1972 OSHA regulations.   
When considering foreseeability, it is important not to be swayed by hindsight bias 
because “[i]t can be said, with the benefit of hindsight, that everything is foreseeable.”  
Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2012).  To make the 
determination what the defendant should have known in a take-home exposure case, a 
court should consider “what information about the nature of asbestos was known at the 
time of plaintiff’s alleged exposure” and “what information defendant could reasonable 
be held accountable for knowing.”  Id. at 1099.  Indeed, “the Court must look to whether 
the harm to [plaintiff] was foreseeable in the first instance” because “with the benefit of 
hindsight, an argument can be made that it was foreseeable that those exposed to asbestos 
on Defendant’s premises would later expose those they came in contact with at home.”  
Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 539.  The relevant timeframe for this appeal is 1961–66 (when 
Mr. Boynton undisputedly worked at KUC’s smelter), several years before the 
promulgation of the 1972 OSHA regulations.  Although the potential danger to workers 
from direct, and very high, occupational exposure settings— such as asbestos mining and 
asbestos textile milling and manufacturing —was generally foreseeable in the 1960s, 
harm from non-occupational asbestos exposure was not reasonably foreseeable until 
1972, at the very earliest.   
There was very little, if any, information available about the danger of take-home 
asbestos exposure when Mr. Boynton worked at KUC’s smelter, and there is no evidence 
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KUC had any knowledge of such danger.  Speculation that asbestos-related diseases 
might result from take-home exposure was first raised in asbestos scientific literature in 
1965 (the “Newhouse Study”).6  But the Newhouse Study was conducted in London and 
was not capable of focusing solely on take-home exposure because the studied population 
had significant community environmental exposure from a crocidolite asbestos factory in 
the neighborhood.  Other courts have recognized the Newhouse Study and still 
determined that no duty existed for take-home exposure.7  This one study, with 
questionable relevance to take-home exposure and published at the very end of Mr. 
Boynton’s time at KUC’s smelter, simply does not make take-home exposure reasonably 
foreseeable to an end user of asbestos products on the other side of the globe, like KUC.       
Instead, the very earliest that harm from take-home exposure could be reasonably 
foreseeable is 1972, when the OSHA regulations were released, which approach has been 
followed by multiple courts across the country: Martin, 2007 WL 2682064 at *5, aff’d, 
Martin, 561 F.3d at 445; Fourteenth District, 740 N.W.2d at 218; Farrar, 69 A.3d at 
1036–39.  
                                                 
6 The Newhouse Study was cited in Dr. Richard Lemen’s affidavit, filed by Plaintiff in 
opposition to the Premises Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  (R. 02966–67.) 
7 See, e.g., Farrar, 69 A.3d at 1036–37 (“The study that experts from both sides regarded 
as more significant was one by Muriel Newhouse and Hilda Thompson in 1965.  The 
study concerned 76 persons who lived in the vicinity of an asbestos factory in the London 
area and who contracted lung disease.  Although most (67) of those persons had neither 
an occupational nor a household exposure to asbestos but . . . may have been exposed 
because they lived in the vicinity of the factory, nine of the subjects were exposed to dust 
brought home by a family member and later were diagnosed with mesothelioma or 
asbestosis.”); Martin, 561 F.3d at 445 (finding no duty while recognizing “Plaintiff’s 
expert report concedes that the first studies of bystander exposure were not published 
until 1965.”).   
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In Martin, Vernon Martin was allegedly exposed to asbestos from 1951 to 1963 
while working for the defendant.  His son, Dennis Martin, contracted mesothelioma after 
being exposed to the asbestos brought home on the “clothing, hair, and person of his 
father.”  2007 WL 2682064 at *1.  The court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment because the defendant did not “owe[] a legal duty to [Dennis Martin] 
because the potential harm of non-occupational asbestos exposure was not foreseeable to 
[the defendant] during the relevant time period.”  Id. at *5.  “Although the general danger 
of prolonged occupational asbestos exposure to asbestos manufacturing workers was 
known by at least the mid-1930s, the extension of that harm to others was not widely 
known until at least 1972, when OSHA regulations recognized a causal connection.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  “Simply put, the literature at the time did not place [the defendants] 
on notice that bystanders/nonworkers such as [the decedent] were subject to health 
maladies due to second-hand exposure to asbestos-containing materials.”  Id. (granting 
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on no legal duty); see also Martin, 
561 F.3d at 444–45 (“We agree with the district court that Martin has failed to show the 
risk was foreseeable at the relevant times. . . . Without any published studies or any 
evidence of industry knowledge of bystander exposure, there is nothing that would justify 
charging [the defendants] with such knowledge during the time that Mr. Martin’s father 
was working with asbestos.”).   
In Farrar, Jocelyn Farrar was diagnosed with mesothelioma caused by take-home 
asbestos exposure from shaking out and laundering her grandfather’s clothes from 1968–
69.  69 A.3d at 1030.  The Maryland Court of Appeals determined the harm was not 
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foreseeable during the pre-OSHA timeframe of 1968–69, which is even later than the 
timeframe here of 1961–66: 
Although the danger of exposure to asbestos in the workplace was well-
recognized at least by the 1930s, the danger from exposure in the household 
to asbestos dust brought home by workers, though in hindsight perhaps 
fairly inferable, was not made publicly clear until much later. . . . The clear 
and most widely broadcast breakthrough came in June 1972, when OSHA 
adopted regulations dealing specifically with the problem of tracking 
asbestos dust on clothing into a home. . . . On the record before us, we 
conclude that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding a duty on the 
part of [the defendant] to warn Ms. Farrar, back in 1968–69, of the danger 
of exposure to the dust on her grandfather’s clothes. 
 
Id. at 1036–39 (emphasis added). 
The relevant time period for the take-home exposure in Fourteenth District was 
1954 to 1965.  740 N.W.2d at 218.  In finding no duty, the court explained that “we did 
not know what we know today about the hazards of asbestos” and the plaintiff’s expert 
conceded that “the first published literature suggesting a ‘specific attribution to washing 
of clothes’ was not published until 1965.”  Id.  As such, “the risk of ‘take home’ asbestos 
exposure was, in all likelihood, not foreseeable by defendant while [the employee] was 
working at defendant’s premises from 1954 to 1965.”  Id.  The court cited a separate 
Texas appellate decision, which opinion was replaced on other grounds, stating that “the 
risk of ‘take home’ asbestos exposure was not foreseeable to Exxon Mobil before 1972” 
because OSHA “did not promulgate regulations prohibiting employers from allowing 
workers who had been exposed to asbestos to wear their work clothes home until” then.  
Id. 
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Just like Martin, “there is nothing that would justify charging [KUC] with” 
knowledge of harms resulting from take-home asbestos exposure “during the time that 
[Mr. Boynton] was working with asbestos.”  561 F.3d at 444–45.  Indeed, “the literature 
at the time did not place [KUC] on notice that bystanders/nonworkers such as [Mrs. 
Boynton] were subject to health maladies due to second-hand exposure to asbestos-
containing materials.”  Martin, 2007 WL 2682064 at *5. 
B. KUC was not in the best position to prevent harm from take-home 
asbestos exposure to Mrs. Boynton.  
 
The second “minus” factor does not consider which party has the deepest pockets 
but “considers whether the defendant is best situated to take reasonable precautions to 
avoid injury.”  2012 UT 11, ¶ 30.  This factor “typically” cuts against creating a “duty 
where a victim or some other third party is in a superior position of knowledge or control 
to avoid the loss in question.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals of New York analyzed this same 
factor in a take-home asbestos exposure case and found that it weighed in favor of no 
duty.  NYC Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 120.  In that case, and similar to here, the 
plaintiffs argued that the employer was “in the best position to protect against the risk of 
harm” to the employee’s spouse because “it might have compelled [the employee] to 
wear clean clothes home from work or to warn [his spouse] about the dangers of washing 
his soiled uniforms.”  Id.  The court disagreed that the employer was in the best position, 
reasoning that the employer “was, in fact, entirely dependent upon [the employee]’s 
willingness to comply with and carry out such risk-reduction measures.”   Id. 
  21 
Mr. Boynton, not KUC, was in a “superior position of control” to prevent harm to 
Mrs. Boynton from take-home asbestos exposure because he ultimately carried asbestos 
fibers home on his clothing and thereby exposed Mrs. Boynton.  Even if KUC had 
policies requiring the changing or laundering of clothes at the worksite, like NYC 
Asbestos, those policies would have been “entirely dependent upon [Mr. Boynton’s] 
willingness to comply with and carry out such risk-reduction measures.”  Id.  Admittedly, 
neither KUC nor Mr. Boynton were in great positions to prevent this harm from 
occurring—due to not knowing about the potential harm from take-home exposure—but 
the question under this factor is whether KUC is best situated to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent injury, which it was not.8   
C. Finding a duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases creates an almost 
infinite universe of potential plaintiffs.  
 
“Asbestos claims have given rise to one of the most costly products-liability crises 
ever within our nation’s legal system.”  Fourteenth Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d at 220.  The 
pool of traditional asbestos plaintiffs is shrinking, so plaintiff attorneys are trying to 
expand the pools of potential plaintiffs and defendants by asserting take-home asbestos 
cases against premises owners.  However, finding a duty in take-home asbestos exposure 
cases would open the flood gates to asbestos litigation in Utah.  “[L]iability for take-
home exposure would essentially be infinite” because the duty would necessarily be 
extended to “children, babysitters, neighbors, dry cleaners, or any other person who 
                                                 
8 KUC is not arguing that Mr. Boynton was in a “superior position of knowledge” 
because neither KUC nor Mr. Boynton knew about the risk of take-home asbestos 
exposure, but Mr. Boynton was in a “superior position of control.”  
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potentially came in contact with [the employee’s] clothes.”  Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 
540.9  But “there is no principled basis in the law upon which to distinguish the claim of a 
spouse” with the claim of any other person potentially exposed to an employee’s 
asbestos-covered clothing.  Riedel, 2007 WL 4571196 at *12.   
The burden on a premises owner “to warn or otherwise protect every potentially 
foreseeable victim of off-premises exposure to asbestos is simply too great.”  Id.  Such a 
burden—“protecting every person with whom a business’s employees and the employees 
of its independent contractors come into contact, or even with who their clothes come 
into contact”—is an “extraordinarily onerous and unworkable burden.”  Fourteenth Dist. 
Court, 740 N.W.2d at 217.  For these reasons, the third “minus” factor weighs heavily 
against creating a duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases. 
IV. THERE IS NO DISPUTE OF FACT THAT PRECLUDES SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
 
In denying KUC’s motion for summary judgment, the district court stated there is 
a disputed issue of material fact precluding summary judgment:  
With respect to [KUC], viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. 
Boynton and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in her favor, 
affirmative act of specifying and using asbestos pipe insulation and its 
employee-insulators’ affirmative acts of exposing Mr. Boynton, a direct 
employee of [KUC], raises a disputed issue of material fact as to whether a 
legal duty extends to Mrs. Boynton. 
                                                 
9 Williams, 608 S.E.2d at 209 (declining to extend employer’s duty beyond the workplace 
to encompass all who might come into contact with an employee or an employee’s 
clothing outside the workplace, reasoning that to impose a duty would “expand 
traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds and create an almost infinite 
universe of potential plaintiffs”); NYC Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 122 (explaining that 
the duty line is “not so easy to draw” in take-home asbestos cases); see also In re 
Asbestos Litig., 2012 WL 1413887 at *3 (same). 
  23 
 
(R. 05447 (emphasis added).)  Notably, the district court did not address whether any of 
the “minus” factors would eliminate a duty that otherwise exists, but instead merely 
pointed to a supposed dispute of fact involving whether KUC engaged in misfeasance.   
The Court should reverse the district court because there are not any disputed 
issues of fact that prevent the Court from finding that KUC did not owe a duty to Mrs. 
Boynton.  The parties agree that Mr. Boynton worked at KUC’s premises from 1961 to 
1966.  Further, for purposes of summary judgment and this appeal only, it is undisputed 
that KUC used asbestos-containing insulation and its workers removed and/or installed 
insulation in the vicinity where Mr. Boynton worked.  The issue is not whether these 
facts are in dispute, but rather, the issue is whether Mr. Boynton contends that KUC was 
negligent in performing these acts such that it caused his wife’s harm.  As set forth in 
detail above, the crux of Mr. Boynton’s claims against KUC concern omissions—failing 
to prevent Mr. Boynton from carrying asbestos fibers home on his clothing and failing to 
warn him of the potential dangers posed by asbestos exposure—and not active 
misfeasance.  Finally, whether Mr. Boynton’s allegations constitute affirmative acts or 
mere omissions is the threshold issue in the duty analysis and is therefore entirely a 
question of law to be determined by a court, not a jury. 
The Court should apply the Jeffs factors and hold that KUC did not owe a duty to 
Mrs. Boynton.   
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CONCLUSION 
 The district court incorrectly denied KUC’s motion for summary judgment, and 
KUC should prevail on appeal because it did not owe a duty to Mrs. Boynton.   
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